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Bullock and the Aftermath 
Adolf Sturmthal 
This study présents the main recommendations of Lord 
Bullock's Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy in 
Great Britain. 
While there is a century-old tradition of a search for some ill-
defined forms of industrial democracy, the présent drive for institutions 
that might corne under this label, may perhaps be better traced to the 
semi-revolutionary upheavals in Europe in 1968/9. At least it may be 
said that thèse events gave a new push to the movement and led to 
various more or less concrète proposais for législation or other institu-
tions of this kind. 
One clear expression of the movement was the décision of the 
European Economie Community to seek a statute for a European 
Company in contrast to the great majority of multinational companies 
which are in fact conglomérâtes of national companies operating under 
the various company laws of the différent countries in which they do 
business. In connection with this endeavor, attempts are being made to 
provide for some form of worker représentation in the directing organs 
of thèse enterprises. While C. Lyon-Caen among others proposed that 
the spécifie form of such représentation be decided by collective bargain-
ing, the Commission of the European Economie Community came out 
in favor of a uniform system. This was in the main patterned after the 
institutions of co-determination existing in West Germany. Since there 
are many other forms of workers' participation in decision-making in 
existence in différent countries and at various levels — from workshop 
to the economy at large — the choice of the German pattern as model 
expresses the belief that this form has contributed to the remarkable 
économie recovery of West Germany from the dévastation brought on 
by World War II and to the high degree of industrial peace characteristic 
of that country. It remains an open question whether the causal relation-
ship should not be reversed, i.e., 
with économie growth as the factor 
that enabled German co-determina-
tion to be so successful. In either 
view, however, it must be admit-
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ted that contrary to many early prédictions the German System of co-
determination does not seem to hâve prevented or even noticeably 
slowed down the progress of the West German economy and the con-
comitant rise of the life standard of the great majority of the population. 
It may be useful, before proceeding any further, to indicate briefly 
some of the main characteristics of the German System. It is based on 
législation. German company law provides for two layers of top manage-
ment: a supervisory board, part-time, determining the gênerai direction 
of company policies; and a managerial group, frequently consisting of 
three full-time members who are to carry out thèse policies. The main 
principle of German co-determination is workers' représentation on 
the supervisory board. In the early législation (1952) this was limited to 
one-third of the membership except for coal and steel, which were 
subject to spécial régulation (1951) giving to workers "paritary'' repré-
sentation on the supervisory board, and one-third représentation in the 
management group. Later union demands for "paritary" représenta-
tion in ail large enterprises were only partly fulfilled (1976). At the plant 
level, some form of co-determination was established by the works 
councils derived from institutions created during World War I, but 
repeatedly modified since, especially through the Works Constitution 
Law of 1972. 
British tradition was opposed to any of thèse institutions. Unions 
were regarded as counter-vailing powers to capital, rather than as di-
rect participants in management. This view prevailed throughout British 
labor history, in spite of the influence of Guild socialism during a short 
period following World War I. Industrial democracy was established 
in the form of collective bargaining at the national level and supplementary 
informai agreements in the plant by way of shop stewards, more or 
less loosely connected with the unions. This philosophy found good 
expression in Hugh Clegg's report on an international seminar held in 
Vienna in 1958, entitled. A New Approach to Industrial Democracy. l 
Its main éléments were union independence from state and management, 
a union monopoly on the représentation of workers' interests, and a 
rejection of the traditional Marxian views that the crucial issue was the 
ownership of the means of production.2 
1
 Oxford, Blackwell, 1960. 
2
 Andrew W. J. THOMPSON: «New Focus on Industrial Democracy in Bri-
tain,» The Armais of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 431, 
May 1977. 
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There has been a clash over the issue of workers' représentation 
on the boards of nationalized enterprises during the lifetime of the 
British Labour Government that came into power in 1929. Herbert 
Morrison, as Minister of Transport, had prepared a London Passenger 
Transport Bill which, contrary to Guild Socialist tradition, as represent-
ed by G.D.H. Cole's writings, did not provide for workers' représenta-
tion on the board that was to administer the transport System of Greater 
London. The board members were to be selected solely on the grounds 
of competency. A sharp debate ensued between Morrison and Ernest 
Bevin, later the powerful Minister in the war-time Churchill/Attlee 
coalition cabinet and then even more powerful in the Labour govern-
ment after World War II. At the time of the debate Bevin was leader 
of the big transport workers' union and even as such no negligible foe. 
The solution then found was a compromise that permitted — as a 
good compromise should — both sides to claim victory. Unionism, 
but not a given union was to be represented on the board by experts 
in industrial relations. However, while selected by the Minister among 
union officers, they would hâve to resign their union office upon being 
appointed and would be responsible only to the Minister rather than 
the union or the workers of the enterprise. Their number remained 
undetermined, but a proposai to give worker nominees half of the board 
membership was turned down by a narrow majority at the Trade Union 
Congress of 1933.3 For the time being, ail this proved a purely theoretical 
discussion. The Labour government had resigned before the Morrison 
bill had been passed. From then on until 1940 Labour remained in the 
opposition. 
However, in 1944 the Trade Union Congress published its Intérim 
Report on Post-War Reconstruction, which in its essentials retained 
the compromise worked out earlier. In the interest of the efficiency of 
the industry itself, said the Report, experienced trade unionists should 
be included among the board members. The T.U.C., after consulting 
the appropriate unions, would submit a list of candidates to the Minister 
in charge of the particular nationalized industry. Upon appointment to 
the board, the trade unionist "should surrender any position held in, 
or any formai responsibility to, the Trade Union." 
Essentially, this System which — with one minor exception — 
prevails to this day, was based on the view that "one could not sit 
on both sides of the bargaining table." The union was a countervailing 
power to capital, rather than its partner in the management of the 
3
 Adolf STURMTHAL: Unity and Diversity in European Labor, The Free Press, 
Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, pp. 180/1. 
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enterprise. There was some temporary confusion within the movement 
on the exact meaning of this. No major discussion preceded the adop-
tion of this policy and the Labour Party's detailed proposais on the 
nationalization of coal, power and transport published at about the same 
time as the Intérim Report, still referred to "workers' participation" 
in the management of nationalized industries. But "Let Us Face the 
Future," the élection manifesto of 1945, no longer did so and at the 
party conférence in May of that year, Emanuel Shinwell, speaking for 
the Party Executive, declared that "the form of participation" of the 
workers in the management of the industry was "a matter that had 
to be worked out ."4 
It is important to remember that ail this referred only to the manage-
ment of nationalized, not of private, enterprises. The only, relatively 
minor, change of the system occurred later in the steel industry, also 
a nationalized industry: active trade unionists became part-time 
directors on the divisional level. 
Thèse matters rested until the late sixties, when the issue of 
workers' participation was raised unsuccessfully by a minority of the 
members of the Donovan Commission (officially, Royal Commission 
on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, chaired by Lord Dono-
van). The Labour Government took note of this comment in its 
White Paper, In Place of Strife, saying that, "it favored experiments 
with workers' directors and intended consultations as to how this might 
best be achieved."5 For the rest, the paper stated that collective bargain-
ing "represents the best method so far devised of an advancing industrial 
democracy." 
However, with Britain's entry into the Common Market, the EEC 
discussions about a European company law, and — last but not least 
— the spectacular growth of the West German economy, the issue of 
workers' participation was revived in the early 1970's. The initial push 
came from the T.U.C. whose research staff prepared a paper on the 
subject in 1973. This, entitled "Industrial Democracy," clearly favored 
workers' représentation on the board of directors. The main argument 
was that collective bargaining did not extend to the gênerai économie 
policies of the différent enterprises, such as investment, location, 
closures, etc., that are of vital interest to workers. The T.U.C. Congress 
adopted the paper and made its contents part of the discussions with 
4
 Moreover, even the high priest of Guild Socialism. G.D.H. COLE, in a study 
of the National Coal Board (rev. éd., London, 1949, pp. 10/11) concluded that his idea 
could not be implemented in a capitalist society. 
5
 THOMPSON, op. cit., p. 34. 
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the Labour Party about what came to be known as the Social Contract. 
In exchange for voluntary wage controls by the unions, various reforms 
were promised, among them some form of "industrial democracy." In 
order to prépare detailed proposais on the subject a committee of inquiry 
was appointed in 1975 under the chairmanship of the distinguished 
Oxford historian, Lord Bullock, the author of an outstanding book on 
Hitler and a leading student of German affairs. The majority of the 
committee members were rather close to the Labour Party or the T.U.C. 
Three of the eleven members were trade unionists. The "term of référ-
ence" given the committee, i.e., the directives under which it was to 
operate, fairly clearly indicated what it was expected to do. To quote: 
Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the 
control of companies by means of représentation of the board of directors, 
and accepting the essential rôle of trade union organizations in this process, 
to consider how such an extension can best be achieved, taking into 
account in particular the proposais of the Trades Union Congress report 
on industrial democracy as well as expérience in Britain, the EEC and 
other countries... 
The findings of the committee were to apply only to the private economy 
while another committee was to investigate the public sector. 
The new TUC position, briefly outlined above, accepted the basic 
features of German co-determination while rejecting the German workers 
council. Moreover, the TUC demanded equal représentation with 
owners on supervisory boards if the German two-board System were to 
be adopted, i.e., a supervisory policy-making board and a small me-
nagerial group. If a single board were to be retained, the TUC accepted 
a minority position in members — with managers added to shareholders' 
représentatives — provided the managers had no voting rights and 
the number of shareholders' représentatives did not exceed that of union 
delegates on the board. The method of designating the workers' repré-
sentatives should be left to the discrétion of the union with non-union 
members excluded from any décision. The parity between shareholders 
and workers need not lead to a stalemate ; a rotating chairman with 
deciding vote or an independent chairman could be appointed. No need 
existed to appoint consumer représentatives on the boards, the more 
so as they would hâve no clearly defined constituency to report to. 
The report of the Committee of Inquiry was submitted to the 
Minister and the public in early 1977 on the basis of no fewer than 337 
written submissions. More than 200 pages long, the Report is a sub-
stantial document. Its underlying philosophy is stated in the following 
paragraph which is part of the conclusion. 
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During our inquiry we found a widespread conviction, which we share, that 
the problem of Britain as an industrialized nation is not a lack of native 
capacity in its working population so much as a failure to draw out their 
énergies and skill to anything like their full potential. It is our belief that 
the way to release those énergies, to provide greater satisfaction in the work-
place and to assist in raising the level of productivity and efficiency in 
British industry — and with it the living standards of the nation — is not 
by récrimination or exhortation but by putting the relationship between 
capital and labour on to a new basis which will involve not just management 
but the whole workforce in sharing responsibility for the success and pro-
fitability of the enterprise. Such a change in the industrial outlook and 
atmosphère will only corne about, however, as a resuit of giving the re-
présentatives of the employées a real, and not a sham or token, share in 
making the stratégie décisions about the future of an enterprise which in 
the past hâve been reserved to management and the représentatives of the 
shareholders. 
This, of course, is close to if not identical with the ideas of the 
TUC. While referring frequently to the West German model and its 
success, the Report recommends rétention of the traditional unitary 
board rather than the division between a supervisory and a management 
board, West German style. There are fundamental décisions which only 
the Board of Directors can make ; they range from liquidation of the 
company to the appointment, removal and pay of senior management 
officiais. Employée représentation occurs at the board of directors level. 
They are to report back to the employées whom they represent but 
keep confidential information "the disclosure of which might damage the 
company." 
The most widely disputed proposai of the committee concerns the 
constitution of the board. The formula "2x + y" has been used as an 
abbreviation: "minority but equal représentation of shareholders and 
employées, entailing a third group of directors on the board." Minority 
employée représentation without that third group was rejected on the 
basis of expérience in Sweden and West Germany where it was found 
that this System provides no effective transfer of power from shareholders 
and management towards workers. The third group is to be elected in 
an uneven number greater than one by agreement of a majority of 
each of the two other groups. 
In principle, agreement should be reached about the organization 
of the board between the recognized trade unions and the existing board. 
If no agreement is reached within six months, the law would prescribe 
the necessary rules based on the 2x + y formula. The chairman should 
be selected by the shareholder représentatives unless the board una-
nimously décides otherwise. However, a preliminary basic décision is 
a vote of ail employées by simple majority constituting at least one-third 
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of the employées in favor of board représentation. Employée repré-
sentatives are to be elected by the union shop steward organization so 
as to prevent the development of an employée organization compétitive 
with the recognized union.6 
The délicate problem of the relationship between employée re-
présentation and collective bargaining is treated with somewhat surpris-
ing optimism: 
"...employée représentatives are most unlikely to demand that senior 
management reveal their bargaining position and strategy and if they did 
make such a demand, they would almost certainly not be supported by the 
Shareholder représentatives and the co-opted directors."7 
The main évidence cited to support this happy perspective is Swedish 
expérience. However, the Swedish law prohibits employée représentatives 
from taking part in board discussions on collective bargains and related 
issues, although in practice this is reported to be only rarely observed. 
More important : the harmonious labor relations of Sweden can hardly 
be used as analogy for the much less friendly industrial relations of the 
U.K. 
There is, of course, a good deal more in the Report such as pro-
posais on an Industrial Democracy Commission, and another on train-
ing facilities, but this paper must refrain from going too far afield. More-
over, events since the Report was published tend to indicate that it 
is unlikely to be translated into fact without considérable changes. 
While the Bullock Committee adopted fairly completely the TUC 
views, the TUC did not represent the entire trade union movement on 
the issue of workers' représentation. Opposition arose on the Left as 
well as on the Right of the labor movement. Indeed, the opposition had 
little in common with the traditional ideological divisions of the move-
ment. Thus the Amalgamated Engineering Union with its 1.3 million 
members usually regarded as leftist has opposed the Report as did the 
Electricians Union with some 450,000 members whose leadership stands 
for right-wing stratégies within the movement. Both unions view their 
rôle to be a countervailing force to capital rather than a partner in manage-
ment. 
As might be expected, opposition came from other sides as well. 
Indeed, the report was far from unanimous and very few influential 
voices outside the committee were raised in favor of the Report. 
6
 The British Employment Protection Act of 1975 provides procédures by which 
unions may claim récognition and establish that they are independent of employers. 
7
 Paragraph 56, p. 125, of the Report. 
306 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 3 
The three industry représentatives on the committee strongly 
dissented from several of the main proposais. They advocated the adop-
tion of the German-type two tiers System of administration. On the super-
visory board the workers' représentatives would be in a minority since 
when no agreement on the sélection of the third 'outsider' group of 
members could be obtained, the shareholders could elect them at their 
annual meeting. Moreover, this part of the scheme should not enter 
into force until three years after employée councils on the shopfloor 
had been in opération. The candidates for the supervisory board would 
hâve to be properly trained, hâve at least three years' expérience on the 
employée council, and hâve been employed by the company for at least 
ten years. Différent catégories of employées would be entitled to separate 
représentation on the boards — blue-collar, white-collar, managerial. 
No board représentation was to be in force unless ail unions repi esented 
in the company agreed or two-thirds of the employée council members 
so requested. No élection of worker représentatives could take place 
unless 60 percent of the employées participât éd. 
On its own the Confédération of British Industry (CBI) has waged 
war against the Bullock proposais and threatened that if they were to 
become law, the CBI would refuse to consult with the government. 
The unfriendly réception given the Report by large parts of the 
public, the lack of unanimity within the trade union management, and 
last but not least, the weakness of the Labour government combined to 
force the government to grope its way towards a more acceptable 
scheme. The main objections as formulated, for instance, by the Econ-
omiste were as follows: 
1. The Report gave too much influence in the sélection of the labor 
directors to the shop stewards, neglecting the union rank and 
file and the non-union workers. 
2. Parity of labor and shareholders représentation on the board 
went farther toward a new social order than would correspond 
to Labour Party électoral strength in the country. 
3. The Bullock proposai of 2x + y — which the Economist calls 
infamous — went further than the West German system in 25 
years' évolution. An inflexibly uniform formula does not fît 
the internai divisions of both of the TUC and the CBI (Con-
fédération of British Industry). 
Yet the Economist favors some form of workers' participation. 
Indeed some minimum level of participation, the journal says, should 
8
 Issue of May 21, 1977, pp. 84/5. 
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be legally enforceable on employers if unions and workforce demand 
it. Thus while the Report undoubtedly goes further than circumstances 
permit, the issue of industrial democracy remains on the agenda not 
only of Great Britain, but also of most industrially advanced nations. 
Whether Lord Bullock's Committee has shown the way toward a solu-
tion of the problem remains an open question. 
Le rapport Bullock et ses répercussions 
Cette étude présente sommairement les recommandations du rapport Bullock 
publié plus tôt cette année; elle étudie les moyens d'instaurer la démocratie industrielle 
en Angleterre. 
Depuis longtemps déjà, mais surtout depuis les événements de 1968-1969, on cher-
che à mettre au point les mécanismes les plus aptes à l'instauration de la démocratie 
industrielle. 
L'auteur signale, au départ, que cette recherche s'inspire de la décision de la Com-
munauté économique européenne d'adopter un type de loi des compagnies différent de 
celles qui gouvernent les sociétés multinationales dans les pays où elles font habituel-
lement affaire. La CEE favorise un système uniforme qui s'inspirerait de la législation 
de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest parce qu'on estime que cette législation a beaucoup contri-
bué au redressement économique de ce pays après la guerre et au maintien d'un haut 
degré de paix industrielle. 
L'auteur rappelle ensuite les principales caractéristiques du système allemand, soit 
la représentation des travailleurs aux deux paliers de la société: au conseil de surveil-
lance qui détermine la politique générale de l'entreprise ainsi qu'au bureau de direction 
chargé de l'application de cette politique. La principale originalité de la démocratie 
industrielle en Allemagne consiste donc dans la représentation des travailleurs au sein de 
l'entreprise. Minoritaire au départ, cette représentation est devenue paritaire aux con-
seils de surveillance l'an dernier. 
La tradition britannique, où l'on conçoit les syndicats comme les adversaires du 
capital, s'oppose à ce genre d'institutions. Face à l'État et aux employeurs, la démocratie 
industrielle y repose sur la négociation collective, le monopole syndical de représenta-
tion des travailleurs et le rejet de la théorie marxiste selon laquelle l'enjeu de la lutte 
serait la propriété des moyens de production. 
Pour illustrer son opinion, l'auteur cite un certain nombre d'exemples. Ainsi, en 
1929, lors de l'étatisation du système de transport dans la région londonienne, le Ministre 
des transports s'est gardé de nommer des représentants des travailleurs au bureau de 
direction. Les parties sont arrivées à un compromis selon lequel, non pas le syndicat 
représentant les travailleurs de l'entreprise, mais le mouvement syndica] y serait repré-
senté par des spécialistes en relations du travail qui n'étaient responsables qu'au Ministre. 
Plus tard, en 1944, le rapport de la Commission de reconstruction d'après-guerre 
recommanda que des syndicalistes d'expérience soient nommés aux bureaux de direction, 
mais on y émettait l'opinion qu'il ne saurait être question que les représentants des tra-
vailleurs «s'assoient des deux côtés de la table en même temps». Le rôle du syndicat 
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était conçu comme une force destinée à faire échec au capital plutôt que son partenaire 
dans la direction des entreprises. D'ailleurs, lorsqu'on parlait de participation des tra-
vailleurs à la direction des entreprises, on ne visait que les entreprises nationalisées et 
non pas le secteur privé. 
Les choses en restèrent là jusqu'au début des années 60, alors qu'une minorité 
des membres de la Commission Donovan souleva de nouveau le problème de la partici-
pation des syndicats à la direction des entreprises. Le gouvernement travailliste en tint 
compte en favorisant des expériences en ce sens, tout en reconnaissant que la négocia-
tion collective restait encore la meilleure méthode de promouvoir la démocratie industrielle. 
Au début des années 70, avec l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la CEE et le 
développement spectaculaire de l'économie allemande, l'idée de la participation des 
travailleurs à la gestion refit surface et, en 1973, le Trade-Union Congress publia un 
exposé sur le sujet. Celui-ci favorisait nettement la participation des travailleurs au sein 
des bureaux de direction. Cette demande s'appuyait sur le fait que la négociation col-
lective ne touchait pas aux politiques générales des entreprises, en particulier à leur fi-
nancement, à leur aménagement et à leur fermeture, toutes questions où se trouvent 
engagés les intérêts vitaux des travailleurs. Cette déclaration adoptée, le contenu en fut 
discuté avec les instances du Parti travailliste d'où ce qui a été connu depuis sous le 
nom de contrat social. En échange de l'acceptation volontaire par les syndicats de cer-
taines mesures de contrôle des salaires, diverses réformes furent promises et, parmi elles, 
une forme quelconque de démocratie industrielle. 
En vue d'en préparer l'aménagement, une commission d'enquête fut instituée en 
1975 sous la présidence de Lord Bullock, historien de grande renommée. La majeure 
partie de ses membres était formée de personnes rattachées au Parti travailliste. Trois 
de ses onze membres appartenaient aux syndicats. Ses recommandations ne devaient 
s'appliquer qu'au secteur privé de l'économie. 
Le TUC acceptait l'idée de la participation des travailleurs à la direction telle 
qu'elle existait en Allemagne, mais rejetait l'existence des conseils ouvriers. Le TUC 
exigeait une représentation égale à celle des propriétaires si on acceptait un système à 
double palier. Si on retenait l'idée d'un seul bureau, le TUC acceptait une représenta-
tion minoritaire de ses membres subordonnément à ce que les administrateurs n'aient 
pas droit de vote et que le nombre des représentants des actionnaires ne dépasse pas 
celui des représentants des syndicats. La parité entre actionnaires et ouvriers ne devait 
pas conduire à une impasse, le président, choisi à tour de rôle entre les deux groupes, 
ayant voix prépondérante ou encore un président indépendant pouvant être choisi. On 
n'y prévoyait pas non plus la représentation des consommateurs à ce bureau de direction. 
Le rapport de la Commission, qui compte plus de deux cent pages, fut remis au 
début de 1977. Les recommandations du rapport se rapprochent beaucoup des sugges-
tions du TUC et on y référé fréquemment au système allemand. Le rapport recommande 
le maintien du bureau de direction unique. Les décisions fondamentales au bureau de 
direction vont de la liquidation de la société à la nomination et au renvoi des cadres 
supérieurs. 
La proposition de la Commission qui fut la plus controversée fut celle de la consti-
tution du bureau suivant la formule «2X ± Y», soit une représentation minoritaire mais 
égale des actionnaires et des employés exigeant la présence d'un troisième groupe dans 
le bureau de direction qui serait désigné sur l'accord de la majorité des deux groupes. 
En principe, cela signifiait que la constitution du bureau de direction devait se faire entre 
le bureau de direction existant et les syndicats reconnus. S'il n'y avait pas d'accord dans 
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les six mois, la loi prescrirait, l'application de la règle «2X ± 1Y». Le président serait 
choisi parmi les représentants des actionnaires, à moins que le bureau de direction n'en 
décide unanimement autrement. 
Le problème délicat de la négociation collective est considéré dans le rapport avec 
un optimisme surprenant, alors qu'il s'inspire de l'expérience suédoise où, cependant, la 
loi défend la participation des représentants syndicaux dans les bureaux de direction aux 
négociations collectives. 
Depuis la publication du rapport, qui s'est inspiré largement des propositions du 
TUC, on s'est rendu compte que celui-ci ne représentait pas l'unanimité des syndicats 
affiliés sur le sujet. Il y eu opposition au rapport tant de la gauche que de la droite du 
mouvement syndical. D'un côté comme de l'autre, certains syndicats veulent s'en tenir, 
pour des motifs différents, à leur rôle d'adversaires ou d'opposants au capital. 
D'autre part, les trois représentants du patronat se sont fortement désolidarisés 
des principales recommandations de la Commission. Ils ont préconisé le système allemand 
de représentation à deux paliers et la Confédération of British Industry a décidé de com-
battre les propositions du rapport et a menacé, si celles-ci étaient traduites dans une lé-
gislation, de refuser de participer à des consultations avec le gouvernement. 
L'auteur conclut que le rapport a reçu un mauvais accueil de la part de l'opinion 
publique, même si celle-ci favorise certaines formes de représentation, qu'il va beaucoup 
plus loin que les circonstances ne le permettent présentement, non seulement en Grande-
Bretagne, mais dans les autres pays industrialisés. 
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